A Rigorous Political Science Analysis of Britain and France Attempting to Negotiate With a Body of Water
A Rigorous Political Science Analysis of Britain and France Attempting to Negotiate With a Body of Water
By Professor Alan Nafzger, PhD (University College Dublin, Political Theory, with a minor in Quiet Despair) – Submitted for peer review to the Journal of Things Everyone Can See But Governments Cannot, Vol. 44, Issue 2, April 2026
Abstract
This paper examines the emerging geopolitical phenomenon of Performative Multilateralism – hereinafter referred to as PM, not to be confused with the other PM, who is also performative – as demonstrated by the United Kingdom and France’s diplomatic response to the 2026 Strait of Hormuz crisis. Drawing on classical realist theory, liberal institutionalism, and one overheard conversation in a Whitehall corridor that I am treating as primary source material, this analysis concludes that the 40-nation video conference convened by Starmer and Macron on 17 April 2026 represents a textbook case of what theorists call the appearance of agency, or, in layman’s terms, doing the meeting instead of the thing.
1. Introduction: The Problem of Talking at Geography
It is a foundational principle of political science – one I have been teaching for twenty-three years, to increasingly glazed undergraduate faces – that power is the ability to compel behaviour in others. This is Dahl (1957). This is also, arguably, common sense, but we do not say that in academic papers because common sense does not generate grant funding. The question before us is simple: Can a Zoom call compel the Strait of Hormuz to reopen? The answer, which I will spend approximately 4,000 words arriving at, is: no. And yet here we are. Since February 28, 2026, Iran has effectively closed the Strait of Hormuz to foreign vessels, disrupting roughly 20% of the world’s seaborne oil supply. The United States responded with a naval blockade. Britain and France responded with a conference call. Political scientists call this a divergence in escalatory preference. Everyone else calls it something unprintable.
2. Theoretical Framework: The Nafzger Taxonomy of Diplomatic Non-Events
Over my career – marked, I should note, by a series of publications that have been described as “provocative,” “heterodox,” and, on one occasion by a colleague at the LSE, “frankly exhausting” – I have developed a taxonomy for classifying diplomatic activity that produces the sensation of progress without any of its nutritional content. I call it the Nafzger Scale of Sovereign Gesture, ranging from Level 1 (a strongly worded statement) to Level 5 (a strongly worded statement with a flag behind it). The UK-France Hormuz Initiative registers, by my calculation, at approximately Level 3.7: a multilateral conference with a name, a Zoom link, forty attendees, and a French co-chair who has already begun framing the communiqué as historically significant. For comparison: the Congress of Vienna (1814-1815) was a Level 4.2. It also took longer and had better catering.
2.1 The Doctrine of Aggressive Nodding
A leaked internal memo – which came to me through channels I will not disclose but which involved a photocopier and a civil servant who shall remain nameless but whose lanyard colour I have noted – suggests that the UK Foreign Office has operationalised what it internally describes as “forward-leaning engagement.” In the academic literature, I am classifying this as Aggressive Nodding: the systematic deployment of visible attentiveness as a substitute for policy. This is not unprecedented. Students of British diplomatic history will recall the Nod of Suez (1956), the Thoughtful Head-Tilt of Kosovo (1999), and, most recently, the Concerned Brow of Brexit (2016-2023, ongoing in some constituencies).
3. A Structural Analysis of Operation Please
The 17 April 2026 summit – co-chaired by Prime Minister Keir Starmer and President Emmanuel Macron and described by the Élysée as the “Initiative for Maritime Navigation in the Strait of Hormuz” – merits close structural analysis. I have conducted this analysis. I will now share it with you, whether you are prepared or not. Per CNBC, the summit brought together more than 40 nations to discuss a “peaceful multinational and strictly defensive mission” to restore freedom of navigation – specifically, once the war is over. I want to pause here and direct the reader’s attention to that final clause: once the war is over. In other words: once the problem resolves itself, these 40 nations stand ready to assist with the aftermath. This is, structurally, the geopolitical equivalent of calling the fire brigade after the house has stopped burning in order to discuss ventilation standards.
3.1 The Division of Labour: Who Is Doing What
According to sources cited by the Athens Times – which is not a publication I normally cite in academic work but which had better information than most of the British press, which I find professionally humiliating – the UK is leading the “diplomatic track” while France handles “military coordination.” I have prepared the following table for pedagogical clarity:
| Nation | Assigned Role | Professor’s Assessment |
|---|---|---|
| United Kingdom | Diplomatic track | Scheduling further meetings about diplomatic tracks |
| France | Military coordination | Assessing which of 40 nations might lend a frigate if asked with sufficient Gallic gravitas |
| 40 other nations | TBC | Muted. Possibly on a different tab. |
| United States | Not invited | Has already deployed a blockade; turned back 13 ships; declared the operation “fully implemented.” Did not attend the Zoom call. Was busy. |
4. The Realist Critique: What Thucydides Would Have Said (Paraphrased for a Contemporary Audience Who Has Not Read Thucydides)
Classical realism, as articulated by Thucydides, Machiavelli, and – in his more coherent moments – Henry Kissinger, holds that states act in accordance with their interests and that power, not norms, determines outcomes in the international system. “The strong do what they can,” Thucydides wrote, “and the weak suffer what they must.”¹ He did not add: “unless they convene a multilateral video conference, in which case outcomes may vary.” This is because Thucydides did not anticipate Zoom, which is fair – he also did not anticipate the House of Lords, and look how that turned out. The realist critique of the Starmer-Macron initiative is straightforward: without credible force – or at minimum a credible threat of force – the diplomatic track is a monorail with no track. Britain has minesweeping capability, as Starmer has noted. He has noted it carefully, and at length, without specifying whether it will be used. This is what we in the trade call strategic ambiguity, and what the rest of the world calls not answering the question.
4.1 A Note on the Royal Navy, Formerly Known as a Navy
The Royal Navy retains genuine capability. I want to be academically precise here: this is not a piece mocking British naval power, which remains substantial in historical and comparative context. It is a piece mocking the British government’s apparent decision to mention that power at length while declining to deploy it. This is like a chess player announcing they have a queen and then spending six turns rearranging their pawns into a strongly worded formation. I am, in the terminology of my field, “clocking the gap between capability and political will.” My students call it something else. I have asked them to stop.
5. The Liberal Institutionalist Defence: Why the Zoom Call Might, In Theory, Not Be Entirely Useless
In the interest of academic evenhandedness – which I practise in print if not always in the seminar room – I must present the liberal institutionalist counterargument. Liberal institutionalism, championed by Keohane (1984), Nye (1990), and the entire editorial board of the Journal of International Organisations Who Mean Well, holds that international institutions, norms, and multilateral frameworks can constrain state behaviour and produce cooperative outcomes even in anarchic international systems. The 40-nation summit, under this reading, is not theatre. It is norm-building. It is establishing the post-conflict architecture for maritime governance before the conflict ends, so that when the shooting stops, a framework exists. This is a defensible position. I have assigned it as a seminar paper topic. It is also, I should note, the argument one makes when one does not have an aircraft carrier available and needs to appear purposeful in the meantime. Both things can be true. This is what we call nuance. It does not photograph well, which is why politicians tend to avoid it.
6. Empirical Data: The Numbers Behind the Diplomacy
No political science paper is complete without data. I present the following figures, sourced with appropriate academic rigour from a survey I conducted last Tuesday among people who were willing to answer my questions, which turned out to be primarily graduate students who felt they had no choice:
- 58.3% of respondents believe diplomacy works best when backed by someone else’s navy.
- 21% expressed openness to “tone-based deterrence” as a strategic doctrine.
- 12% asked whether the Strait of Hormuz had considered journaling.
- 73% agreed that “most geopolitical conflicts could be resolved if everyone took a moment” – a finding consistent with earlier research by the fictional London Institute for Strategic Optimism, whose work I cite frequently because no one has yet told the grants committee it does not exist.
- 47 – the number of times the word “concerned” appears in the joint UK-France statement. Ships mentioned: zero. This is statistically significant.
YouGov was not involved in this survey. I mention this only so that YouGov knows there is competition.
7. Comparative Case Study: History’s Other Great Diplomatic Non-Events
For contextual framing, I invite the reader to consider the following historical antecedents, ranked by their similarity to the current situation: The Munich Agreement (1938): Chamberlain returned from Germany waving a piece of paper and announcing “peace for our time.” Historians mark this as the gold standard of optimistic document production. The Hormuz summit has not yet produced a document, which means there is still time to improve upon Munich, at least procedurally. The Concert of Europe (1815): Following the Napoleonic Wars, the great powers established a multilateral framework for managing great-power conflict. It worked, more or less, for a century. The Hormuz summit has been running for approximately six days. I will issue a revised assessment in 2126. The Kellogg-Briand Pact (1928): Sixty-two nations signed a treaty outlawing war. War subsequently occurred. The pact is cited in academic literature as an example of aspirational normativity and in the real world as an example of what happens when you hold a very nice signing ceremony and call it a strategy. The Hormuz summit is closest, in my assessment, to a mild hybrid of all three: the optimism of Chamberlain, the multilateral ambition of the Concert, and the enforceability of Kellogg-Briand. This is not a compliment. I say it with warmth, but it is not a compliment.
8. Conclusion: The Marinating Theory of Geopolitics
I will close – as I close all my lectures, to the considerable relief of students who have been watching the clock since the forty-minute mark – with what I call the Marinating Theory of Geopolitics. Diplomacy, like marinating meat, does not cook the steak. It prepares the conditions. It tenderises. It adds flavour to whatever decisive action eventually follows. A good marinade is not nothing – ask any serious cook. But a marinade left indefinitely, with no grill in sight, is simply meat sitting in liquid. The question for Starmer, Macron, and the forty nations currently on mute is: who is bringing the grill? The United States Navy has already answered that question. Whether Britain and France arrive in time to take any credit for the meal remains, as of this writing, an open empirical question. I will monitor developments. I will update my lecture notes. I will almost certainly submit a revised version of this paper to a journal that will take between eighteen months and three years to respond, by which point the Strait will be open, the crisis will be over, and a new one will have begun – probably involving a different body of water, an equally firm tone, and forty-two nations on a call. You are welcome to attend my seminar on the subject. It meets Thursdays. Bring your own tea. The department budget no longer covers it.
Footnotes
¹ Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, Book V, Chapter 17. Not a beach read. I assign it anyway. ² Dahl, R. (1957). “The Concept of Power.” Behavioral Science, 2(3), 201-215. Essential. Also: depressing. ³ Keohane, R. (1984). After Hegemony. Princeton University Press. The institutionalist bible. Read it before arguing with me. Several students have not read it and I have noted their names. 4 Nafzger, A. (2019). “Aggressive Nodding as Foreign Policy Instrument: A Case Study of British Multilateralism, 1973-2019.” Govna.uk Working Paper Series, No. 7. Available upon request. Peer reviewed by my research assistant, who is paid very little and agreed with everything I wrote, which I recognise is a methodological limitation.
The 2026 Strait of Hormuz crisis began on 28 February 2026 when the United States and Israel launched Operation Epic Fury against Iran, prompting Iran to close the strait – a chokepoint handling roughly 20% of global seaborne oil – to foreign vessels. After US-Iran peace talks in Islamabad collapsed on 12 April following 21 hours of negotiations, President Donald Trump announced a naval blockade of Iranian ports. The US military declared the blockade “fully implemented” by 16 April, having turned back 13 ships. Oil prices surged toward $100 per barrel. British Prime Minister Keir Starmer declined to join the blockade, citing the UK’s focus on reopening the strait diplomatically. French President Emmanuel Macron and Starmer announced a joint virtual summit for 17 April 2026 – held today – bringing more than 40 nations together to discuss a “peaceful multinational and defensive mission” for restoring freedom of navigation once hostilities end. Reporting drawn from Wikipedia, CNBC, NBC News, and Athens Times.
Professor Alan Nafzger holds a PhD from University College Dublin. He is the editor of Govna.uk, The London Prat, and Bohiney.com. His academic opinions are his own. His university has asked him to clarify this several times. Auf Wiedersehen, amigo!
